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RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LOSS IN
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The United States and Australia share the long tradition of the
common law. This link is revealed best in the law of negligence.'
Negligence jurisprudence in the United States has traditionally

been the precursor of developments in the law of negligence elsewhere in the common law world. This leadership has been due in

part to the more open fabric of judicial decisionmaking in the
United States. When compared with British Commonwealth
courts, United States courts are more often influenced by the social
and political processes in the community than are the more tradition bound "British" courts, which tend to adhere more strictly to
the doctrine of stare decisis.
Despite this leadership role in the development of the law of
negligence, United States and British Commonwealth decisions on
recovery of economic loss in negligence have occurred in relative

isolation, though exhibiting a remarkable similarity of development.2 Recently, however, the Australian High Court had occasion
*
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1. The commonality of the American and British Commonwealth experience in the
law of torts is succinctly put by a dean of both, Professor J.G. Fleming, formerly Dean of the
Australian National University School of Law and currently Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
There is little evidence to support the impression, not uncommonly encountered
among American lawyers, that English law is beset with archaism characterized by
inflexibility. Despite a more stringent observance of precedent in the Commonwealth, common law techniques offer sufficient elbowroom for constant adjustment
and change. This is especially true of those areas of law, like torts, which by design
are equipped with imprecise norms of reference so as to facilitate legal adjudication
remaining readily responsive to the contemporary social environment. Any comparison between the British and American experience in a given legal field reveals a
basic similarity, not only of the issues occupying judicial attention, but, equally, of
the solutions being adopted. . . . [Djespite political boundaries, both countries are
linked by fundamentally common attitudes to the problem of contemporary life no
less than by the heritage of the common law itself.
Fleming, Developments in the English Law of Medical Liability, 12 VAND. L. REV. 633, 648
(1959).
2. Another academic leader in tort law, Professor Fleming James, has commented:
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to reexamine the prevailing rule on recovery of economic loss. In
Caltex Oil (Australia) Ply. Ltd v. The Dredge "Willemstad,"3 the
Australian High Court departed from the prevailing rule of law.4
Prior to the Caltex case, the accepted rule on the recovery of
pure economic loss in negligence was as follows: a person suffering
pure economic loss resulting from the negligent conduct of another,

in the absence of any physical damage to his property or person,
could not recover from that other person for that loss. 5 This will be
referred to as the "exclusory rule." 6 With some exceptions, this is
the predominant view in the United States.
The purpose of this article is to examine the views put forth by
the High Court in Caltex. An in-depth exposition of these views
can be useful as a guide to expose options and stimulate debate
One [thing that should be noted] is the remarkable parallel between American decisions on this point [that is, pure economic loss] and those in the British Commonwealth. [citations omitted]. These developments were largely independent of each
other; the courts in our country rarely have cited British authority, and the British
courts rarely cite our decisions [citation omitted]. Nevertheless, the developments
have been similar even to details in drawing the line of recovery. . . . Thus, British decisions, which have allowed recovery for economic consequences to one
whose property was physically injured [citations omitted] but denied recovery for
similar loss to one whose property suffered no physical impairment [citations omitted] has an almost exact American analogue.
James, Limitations on Liabilityfor Economic Loss Caused by Negligence - 4 PragmaticAppraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 45-46 (1972).
3. 51 A.L.J.R. 270 (Austl. 1976). The Caltex case was the culmination of years of
judicial and academic comment on recovery in negligence for pure economic loss. See, e.g.,
Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, [1966] i Q.B. 569; S.C.M.
(United Kingdom) Ltd. v. w.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337; Spartan Steel &
Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27; Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (1973); Seaway Hotels Ltd. v. Cragg (Canada) Ltd., 21
D.L.R.2d 264 (Ont. Ct. App. 1959); French Knit Sales v. N. Gold & Sons, [1972] 2
N.S.W.L.R. 132. Contra, Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465
(H.L.). Examples of the academic comment are: Stevens, Negligent Acts Causing PureFinancial Loss.- Policy Factors at Work, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 431 (1973); James, supra note 2;
Smith, Clarificationof Duty - Remoteness Problems Through a New Physiology of Negligence." Economic Loss- A Test Case, 9 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 213 (1974); Atiyah, Negligence andEconomic Loss, 83 L.Q. REV. 248 (1967); Harvey, EconomicLosses andNegligenceThe Searchfor a Just Solution, 50 CAN. B. REV. 580 (1972); Craig, Negligent Misstatements,
Negligent Acts and Economic Loss, 92 L.Q. REV. 213 (1976); Brown, The Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort, 2 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 50 (1972); Feldthusen, Pure Economic Loss
Consequent Upon PhysicalDamage to a ThirdParty, 16 U.W. ONT. L. REV. I (1977).
4. In so doing, the High Court did not ignore American developments. Indeed, in
referring to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals case, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 401 F.2d 558
(1974), Justice Stephen cited a comment on that case. See Comment, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen."
Recovery of a Purely Economic Loss in Negligence, 60 IowA L. REV. 315 (1974).
5. The rule was firmly established by the House of Lords in Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 [1875].
6. This is the term employed by Justice Stephen in Caltex. See Caltex Oil (Australia)
Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 284 (Austl. 1976).
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about the exclusory rule in the context of United States law. This,
in turn, may lead United States courts to rethink the exclusory rule.
It is also proposed to offer some criticism of the Caltex decision, for
the High Court of Australia should not be seen as offering a universal panacea but as adopting an approach worthy of close scrutiny
throughout the common law world. This examination may inspire
bold judicial minds in the United States to augment United States
jurisprudence just as many Commonwealth judicial minds have
been inspired by advances in the law of torts in the United States.7
I.
A.

THE EXCLUSORY RULE

The Pre-Caltex Commonwealth Law

Prior to the Caltex case, a person suffering pure economic loss
resulting from negligent conduct could not recover that loss in a
negligence action from the person causing it. The crucial element
in the rule is "pure economic loss." Pure economic loss is loss not
suffered as a consequence of physical damage to the plaintiff's person or property.8 This may occur in several distinguishable situations: (1) where there is no property damage at all; for example,
where electrical power is disconnected by negligent conduct, causing the temporary shutdown of a factory and consequently loss of
profits; (2) where there is damage to property in which the plaintiff
has no proprietary interest; for example, a bridge connecting one
side of town to another is negligently destroyed; a tavern owner
whose trade is diminished may not recover;9 (3) where damage occurs to the plaintiff's proprietary interest, but the economic loss
suffered is not a consequence of that property damage. This will
occur in cases involving the disconnection of utilities;' 0 for example, the disconnection of electricity may cause the contents of a
blast furnace to congeal. Costs incurred as a consequence of the
congealing - that is, the physical damage - are recoverable.
Profits lost as a result of the disconnection are not recoverable,
since they arise independently of the congealing metal. This loss is
7. See notes 20 & 21 infra, and accompanying text.
8. See Cane, Recovery in the High Court of Purely Economic Loss Causedby Negligent
Acts, 13 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 243 n.1 (1977).
9. Star Village Tavern v. Nield, 71 D.L.R.3d 439 (1976).
10. Economic loss resulting from lost production was not recoverable where electricity
was cut off due to negligent conduct. Accord, Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co.
(Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27; British Celanese Ltd. v. A.H. Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd., [19691
W.L.R. 959 (Q.B.). See S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall & Son Ltd., [1971] 1
Q.B. 337.
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not, in the words of Lord Denning, "truly consequential on material damage.""
The history of the exclusory rule has been well-treated elsewhere.' 2 A classic statement of the rule is found in Cattle v. Stockton Water Works Co.;13 it was most recently confirmed by the
English Court of Appeal in SC.M (United Kingdom) Ltd v. WJ
Whittall& Son Ltd. 4 and in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v. Martin &
Co. (Contractors).15
S C.M. illustrates the corollary of the exclusory rule. That
case held that economic loss consequent upon physical damage is
recoverable. In S C.M, the defendant was a firm of building contractors. Its employees were digging a trench when an electric
cable, which supplied current to many factories situated in the area,
was severed. The severity of the damage caused a power failure,
which affected the S.C.M. factory, causing molten metal in its machines to solidify. Certain machines were damaged beyond repair,
while others could be saved by chipping away the metal. Moreover, profits from one full day's production were lost. The court
denied recovery for lost profits, but allowed recovery for physical
damage and economic loss flowing from the physical damage. The
Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that to be recoverable, loss of
profits must be consequent upon physical damage, and that loss not
consequent upon the damage to
the machines was pure economic
6
unrecoverable.'
hence
and
loss
The rationale for the rule enunciated in S, CM. is found in one
of two limiting factors employed by the courts - the remoteness
issue and the duty issue.' 7 In the latter, the courts have denied the
existence of a duty to refrain from activities that will foreseeably
cause pure economic loss.' 8 In the former, the courts have held
il. S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittall & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337, 342.
See also Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27.
12. Atiyah, supra note 3; Feldthusen, supra note 3.
13. Cattle v. The Stockton Waterworks Co., L.R. 10 Q.B. 453 (1875).
14. S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337.
15. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27.
16. See S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337,
341-53. This was the approach adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Reynolds v.
Bank of America, 53 Cal. 2d 49, 345 P.2d 926 (1959).
17. See Fleming, Remoteness and Duty. The ControlDevices in LiabilityforNegligence,
31 CAN. B. REV. 471 (1953). One author holds that economic loss raises the issue of remoteness but not the issue of duty. See Smith, supra note 3, at 243. See also Harper, Interference
with ContractualRelations,47 Nw. U.L. REV. 873, 893 (1953).
18. The rule is stated here as a duty of care. The exceptions were excluded from the
rule for the purpose of clarity.
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that, while a duty is owed, pure economic loss is by its very nature
too remote to be recoverable.' 9
B.

Rationaleforthe Exclusory Rule

In the face of wider recovery elsewhere in negligence, strict
adherence to the exclusory rule has obliged the courts to justify application of the rule. This justification, which can be traced in
United States and Commonwealth law, has been the fear first ar2
ticulated by Chief Justice Cardozo in UltramaresCorp. v. Touche. 1
In that case, Justice Cardozo stated, in an often repeated phrase,
that to allow recovery for pure economic loss would usher in "lia-

bility in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time, to an
indeterminate class.'
Two aspects of this fear can be discerned. First, from a slight

negligent act may flow enormous economic harm.22 Consider, for
example, the Tasman Bridge disaster in Hobart, Tasmania, in
which a freighter collided with a pylon of the Tasman Bridge over
Hobart harbour, causing a substantial section of the bridge to collapse. Should the master and owner of the freighter be responsible

for the pure economic loss suffered by commuters whose daily jour19. In the S.C.M case, Lord Denning adopted the remoteness test. See S.C.M. (United
Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337, 345. However, in Spartan
Steel he refused the choice, stating: "I think the time has come to discard those tests which
have proved so elusive . . . and to consider the particular relationship in hand, and see
whether or not, as a matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable." Spartan Steel &
Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27.
Just as the exclusory rule rested on either of these formal bases, the court in Caltex was
concerned on which of these bases a test to limit liability should be framed. Justice Mason,
having observed that both courses had been taken in propounding the exclusory rule, found
that "a more acceptable path to a solution of the problem is to be found through the duty of
care." Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 293
(Austl. 1976). Justice Gibbs concluded that the proximity of the relationship between the
plaintiff and defendant went to duty of care, id. at 280, although he confessed that "in this, as
well as in other branches of the law of negligence, questions of duty of care and remoteness
of damage are difficult to disentangle." Id at 275. See also Ins. Comm'r v. Joyce, 77 C.L.R.
29, 56 (1948); Nettleship v. Weston, [19711 2 Q.B. 691. Justice Stephen spoke in terms of the
need for "sufficient proximity between the tortious act and compensible detriment." Caltex
Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 286 (Austl. 1976).
This language would indicate that his Honor saw the question as one of remoteness, although he does not turn his mind to the choice of an appropriate formal limiting mechanism.
See also Cane, supra note 8, at 260.
20. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
21. Id Justice Stephen quotes this description in Caltex, characterizing the application
of the exclusory rule as "draconic." Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 284 (Austl. 1976).
22. James, supra note 2, at 50-51.
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ney was greatly lengthened during the protracted period of reconstruction?2 3 Secondly, an increase in claims would place
unbearable demands on the court system in that a multiplicity of
claims could flow from a single act of negligence.2 4 In the Tasman
Bridge disaster, all commuters to the city of Hobart who had previously used the bridge were potential plaintiffs.
In applying the exclusory rule, the courts have allowed the
pure economic loss to rest where it falls. Hence, all commuters to
Hobart had to bear the cost of extra gasoline and wear and tear on
their vehicles. The reason for this was that pure economic loss was
lower on the spectrum of interests than the courts were willing to
protect.2 5 The interests of society in allowing recovery of personal
and property loss are clear; if a person by acting in a negligent fashion maims another, the former should bear the cost rather than the
victim himself. Functionally, liability in this situation may have a
deterrent effect on negligent behavior.2 6
Part of the reason for denying liability for pure economic loss
was founded on the observation that the person suffering the loss
may carry loss insurance. In Caltex, Justice Stephen emphasized
this point by demonstrating the difficulties of basing recovery on an
economic analysis of loss distribution.2 7
While the exclusory rule remained intact, these justifications
served as a reasonable reference point. The rule was simple and
was supported by rationalizations that seemed to make sense, although on a closer analysis this appeal flowed mainly from constant
repetition over a long period of time. It will be shown below, however, that the test of liability enunciated in Caltex cannot rest on a
mere recitation of the Cardozian incantation if uncertainty is to be
avoided. The interests of the actors and society in drawing the limits of liability must be fully analyzed.
23. See Gypsum Carrier Inc. v. The Queen, 78 D.L.R.3d 175 (1977).
24. Atiyah, supra note 3, at 270-71; Stevens, supra note 3, at 450-53.
25. Compare James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 778, 780-800
(1953) with Atiyah, supra note 3, at 269. An analogy may be drawn with recovery for negligently inflicted nervous shock; the courts were until recently reluctant to impose liability,
partly because courts were not as willing to protect against nervous injury as they were to
protect against physical injury.
26. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW 512-14, 547-57 (2d ed.
1975). But see G. CALABRESi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENT 244-65 (1970); Blum & Kalven,
The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabres" Auto Accidents and GeneralDeterrence,34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 239 (1967).
27. S. WADDAMS, PRODucTs LIABILITY 34 (1974).
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Recovery of Pure Economic Loss Outside the Exclusory Rule

To this point, the exclusory rule was formulated with respect to
negligent conduct to focus the discussion on the tort of negligence.
However, if the negligent conduct also amounts to a public nuisance, such as in the well-known Wagon Mound 28 case, the courts
do not hesitate to award damages for pure economic loss. This is so
because the law of public nuisance contains a limiting aspect that
saves it from the Cardozian nightmare of indeterminate liability: a
plaintiff in an action in public nuisance must establish damage of a
special or particular type which is peculiar to him, as opposed to
the damage suffered by other members of the public. 2 9 The utility
of this requirement in public nuisance cases has led one commentator to favor a rule in negligence which would allow recovery of
pure economic loss if the plaintiff successfully establishes special or
particular damages.3"
Recovery for pure economic loss is also available in torts based
on intentional acts.31 Sui generis exceptions to the exclusory rule
are also carved out by the doctrines of actio per quod servitium
amasit and actio per quod consortium amasit.3 2
D. Inroads into the Exclusory Rule
The first inroads into the exclusory rule occurred in the area of
negligent misstatement. Prior to the House of Lords' decision in
28. Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Miller S.S. (wagon Mound No. 2), [1967] A.C. 617;
Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Eng'r (Wagon Mound), [1961] A.C. 388. The
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council found that the remoteness test for foreseeable damage was common to both negligence and public nuisance actions. Overseas Tankship Ltd. v.
Miller S.S. (Wagon Mound No. 2), 11967] 1 A.C. 617, 640, rev'd sub nom, Miller S.S. v.
Overseas Tankship Ltd., [1963] N.S.W.R. 737. See also Green, The Wagon Mound No. 2ForeseeabilityRevisted, [1967] UTAH L. REV. 197; Dias, Trouble on Oiled Waters- Problems
of the Wagon Mound No. 2, [1967] CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62; Goodhart, The Brief Lfe Story of
Direct Consequence Rule in English Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 857 (1967).
29. Walsh v. Ervin, [1952] V.L.R. 361,368-69; W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 586-88
(4th ed. 1971).
30. Comment, Interference with Business or Occupation - Commercial Fishermen Can
Recover Profits Lost as a Result of Negligently CausedOil Spill, 88 HARV. L. REV. 444, 451-52
(1974).
31. J. HEYDON, ECONOMIC TORTS 14-80 (2d ed. 1978); Jolowicz, The Law of Tort and
Non-PhysicalLoss, 12 J. SoC'v PUB. TCHRS. L. 91, 98-104 (1972); Comment, Foreseeabilityof
Third-Party Economic Injuries - A Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 297-99
(1953).
32. Best v. Samuel Fox & Co., [1952] A.C. 716; Att'y-Gen. New S. Wales v. Perpetual
Trustee, [1955] A.C. 457, 484. See generally H. LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES (1974);
Stevens, supra note 3, at 439; Feldthusen, supra note 3, at 59-60, 62-66.
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Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & PartnersLtd ,33 negligent misstatement as well as negligent conduct was covered by the exclusory
rule. In Hedley Byrne, however, the rule gave way to the ascription
of a duty of care in making statements where the plaintiff and de34
fendant are in a "special relationship.

It is somewhat of a paradox that negligent misstatement, and
not negligent conduct, was the harbinger of liability for pure economic loss. The court in Hedley Byrne recognized that "words are
more volatile than deeds, they travel fast and far afield, [and] they
are used without being expended. '35 On a superficial analysis, this
innate unruliness of words would lead to the conclusion that liabil-

ity for pure economic loss caused by negligent conduct should have
presaged recovery of pure economic loss caused by negligent misstatement. On a closer examination, however, the reason becomes

apparent. Negligent misstatement enjoyed a separate growth and
was uninfluenced by the pervasive foreseeability test which governed the duty of care issue where negligent conduct was involved.3 6 Furthermore, a statement made in the context of a special

relationship is more likely to be made consciously, with an appreciation of its ramifications.3 7 A negligent act, on the other hand, can

amount to a minor transgression of pure oversight, with no consciousness of its possible serious consequences.3 8 This problem is
fuelled by the very broad notions of foreseeability that have be33. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.); see also
PROSSER, supra note 29, at 705.

34. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 486, 502 (Lord
Reid), 503 (Lord Morris) (H.L.). See Lindgren, ProfessionalNegligence in Words and the
Privy Council, 46 AUSTL. L.J. 176 (1972); Stevens, Two Steps Forwardand Three Back, 5
N.Z.U.L. REV. 39 (1972). See also Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971]
A.C. 792. There is a line of cases expanding the ambit of liability to frame the duty test in
terms of reasonable foreseeability. See, e.g., Ministry Hous. & Local Gov't v. Sharp, [1970] 2
Q.B. 223. See generaly Craig, supra note 3.
35. Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [19641 A.C. 465, 534 (H.L.).
36. Nocton v. Ashburton, [1914] A.C. 932, 947. Cf Craig, supra note 3, at 218 (impossible to avoid unbridled liability if law were wedded to the Donoghue v. Stevenson test). By
contrast, respecting negligent misstatement, the courts were able to formulate a limiting test.
37. The Privy Council, on appeal from the High Court, prescribed that the statement be
rendered by a person in the business of giving such advise. Mutual Life & Citizens' Assurance Co. v. Evatt, [1971] A.C. 792.
38. A combination of two slight acts of negligence, leaving inflammable film in the yard
and then putting a match to it, led to great property damage. See Philco Radio v. Spurling
Ltd., [1949] 2 All E.R. 882. Smith v. Leech Brain, [1962] 2 Q.B. 405, illustrates the operation
of the "thin skull," extraordinary, unexpected physical damage resulting from a negligent
act.
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come endemic in the remoteness issue. 39
Despite the separate growth of liability for negligent misstatement, Hedley Byrne has been construed to apply equally to both
negligent misstatement and negligent conduct,4" although this construction was generally refuted in pre-Caltex Commonwealth
courts. 4 ' In Caltex, however, Justices Gibbs, Mason, and Stephen
asserted the applicability of Hedley Byrne to negligent conduct.
Justice Gibbs reasoned that to limit Hedley Byrne to negligent misstatement would be to ignore the finespun distinction between neg-

ligent misstatement and negligent conduct.42

In recent years, additional inroads into the exclusory rule have
been made by Commonwealth courts. The courts have attempted
to carve out exceptions to the rule to meet demands for recovery.
The application of the "physical nexus test" - the corollary to the
exclusory rule - has been used to grant recovery when economic

loss is "truly consequential on physical damage. 43
Some courts have gone beyond the physical nexus test to a
"parasitic damage basis" for recovery of economic loss. The parasitic damage test allows recovery of economic loss as long as some

damage to the plaintiff's person or property is present, regardless of
whether the economic loss is proximately caused by the physical
damage. In Seaway Hotels Ltd v. Gragg (Canada)Ltd,' a power
line supplying the plaintiff's hotel was negligently severed by the
defendant. The plaintiff had no proprietary interest in the line.
The plaintiff recovered damages for spoiled foodstuffs - physical

damage - and for loss of profits caused by closing the restaurant
and bar for lack of refrigeration.4" Here, loss of profits must be
39. See Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270,
292 (Austl. 1976).
40. "[T]he existence of a duty of care to take reasonable care no longer depends upon
whether it is physical injury or financial loss which can reasonably be foreseen." Ministry
Hous. & Local Gov't v. Sharp, [1970] 2 Q.B. 223, 278. See also Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v.
HeUer & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, 516-17 (H.L.).
41. See, e.g., Konstantinidis v. World Tankers (The World Harmony), 11965] 2 W.L.R.
1275 (P., P. Div'l Ct.); Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, [1966] 1
Q.B. 569; British Celanese Ltd. v. A.H. Hunt (Capacitors) Ltd., [1969] 1 W.L.R. 959 (Q.B.).
See also Stevens, supra note 3, at 434.
42. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 278
(Austl. 1976) (Gibbs, J.).
43. See S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Son Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337,
343. See also text accompanying note 16 supra; Reynolds v. Bank of America, 53 Cal. 2d 49,
345 P.2d 926 (1959).
44. 21 D.L.R.2d 264 (Ont. Ct. App. 1959).
45. Stevens, supra note 3, at 443; Harvey, supra note 3, at 594-95.
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considered pure economic loss as no causal connection exists between the physical damage and the lost profits. This holding is now
inconsistent with the decisions of the English Court of Appeal in
S, CM. and Spartan Steel.4 6
A further basis of recovery dependent on the physical damage
test was suggested in Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute.4 7 In Weller, Justice Widgery reasoned that the
particular scope of duty of care owed by the defendant extended to
persons whose property and person were foreseeably at risk. The
plaintiff in Weller did not fall within the scope of the duty of care,
although it was foreseeable that the plaintiff would suffer financial
harm as a result of the defendant's negligence.4 8
The extension of the scope of duty to foreseeable damage was
also employed in the House of Lords' decision in Morrison Steamship Co. v. Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners).4 In Greystoke Castle,
a ship was damaged in a collision at sea. The cargo owners became
liable to general average contribution to the ship's owner. The
cargo owners sued the defendant shipowners to recover their portion of the contribution. The damage was pure economic loss as
the plaintiff's cargo had suffered no damage. A majority of the
House of Lords held this loss recoverable.50 Lord Roche stated in
dicta:
[I]f two lorries, A and B, are meeting one another on the road, I
cannot bring myself to doubt that the driver of lorry A owes a
duty to both the owner of lorry B and to the owner of goods then
carried in lorry B. Those owners are engaged in a common adventure with or by means of lorry B and if lorry A is negligently
46. But see WINFELD & JOLOWICZ ON TORT 52 n.43a (10th ed. W.V.H. Rogers 1975);
Rogers, Economic Loss in the High Court of Australia, 37 CAMB. L.J. 27, 29-30 (1978).
47. Weller & Co. v. Foot and Mouth Disease Research Institute, [1966] 1 Q.B. 569.
48. Id at 587.
49. Morrison Steamship Co. v. Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners), [1947] A.C. 265.
50. The crucial point in the view of Justice Stephen in Caltex was that the duty in
Greystoke Castle was owed to both the owner of the goods and the ship or vehicle owner who
are "engaged in a common adventure in the sense that their respective property is open to the
same modes of injury, and one who encounters the ship or vehicle on the sea or on the
highway owes to each party a like duty of care to avoid the infliction of injury or economic
loss." Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 285
(Austl. 1976).
To anticipate later conclusions on the Caltex case, it is difficult to understand where this
"common adventure" exception stands. Justice Jacobs considered that Greystoke Castle
could not be restricted to "common adventure" situations. Id at 297. Both Justices Gibbs
and Stephen, id at 276 & 288, respectively indicate it is good authority. Justice Gibbs draws
on the case as providing a material factor - "common adventure" - to measure whether
the parties are in a proximate relationship. Id at 279.
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driven and damages lorry B so severely that whilst no damage is
done to the goods in it the goods have to be unloaded for the
repair of the lorry and then reloaded or carried forward in some
other way and the consequent expense is by reason of his contract or otherwise the expense of the goods' owner, then in my
judgment the goods' owner has a direct cause of action to recover
such expense.5 '
The scope of duty approach was employed in the important
Canadian Supreme Court decision, Rivtow Marine Ltd v. Washington Iron Works." In Rivtow, the claim arose out of losses incurred
by the plaintiff in removing a barge from service because of the
possibly dangerous condition of a crane attached to the barge used
in the plaintiff's logging business. The crane had latent defects
which made it dangerous to operate. The plaintiff also requested
damages for the cost of repairs to the crane. The majority awarded
damages incurred in removing the barge from service, but denied
recovery of damages for the cost of repairs to the crane. In his dissent, Justice Laskin disagreed with the majority's finding that the
cost of repairs was not recoverable. Justice Laskin reasoned that
the defendant designer-manufacturer of the crane, Washington
Iron Works, was liable in damages for the cost of repairs because
the defect threatened property or personal damage." Justice
Laskin's dissent relied upon the scope of the duty of care extending
to foreseeable physical damage, even though actual physical damage was absent.
Justice Laskin's dissent in Rivtow was apparently inspired by
Lord Denning's opinion in Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban District
Council.5 4 In Dutton, Denning stated: "If he makes it negligently,
with a latent defect (so that it breaks to pieces and injures someone), he is undoubtedly liable. Suppose that the defect is discovered in time to prevent the injury. Surely he is liable for the cost of
repair."55
In the House of Lords case, Anns v. Merton London Borough
Council,56 Lord Wilberforce was attracted by Mr. Justice Laskin's
reasoning in Rivtow. 5 7 In Anns, the House of Lords was asked to
51. Id at 289.
52. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (1973).
53. Id at 549-53.
54. Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council, 11972] 1 Q.B. 373.
55. Id at 396.
56. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [19771 2 W.L.R. 1024.
57. Id at 1039. In Caltex, Justice Stephen also cites this concept espoused by Justice
Laskin in Rivtow. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R.
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decide whether a local authority was under a duty of care towards
the owners and occupiers of houses in relation to which the local
authority had certain duties, powers, and discretions arising under
the Public Health Act of 1936. The question arose in a factual context similar to that in Dutton;5 8 the issue of whether a duty of care
was owed by the Council towards the owner of a building when an
inspector of the Council had negligently performed an inspection
carried out under the Public Health Act of 1936.
Were the cost of repairs and restoration of damage to the
structure itself physical or economic harm? In Dutton, Lord Denning found that the damage done "was not solely economic loss. It
was physical damage to the house."5 9 In Anns, the House of Lords
confirmed this approach by finding that a duty of care arose under
statute and covered damage to the dwelling house itself.60 The
court stated: "[I]f classification is required, the relevant damage is
in my opinion material, physical damage, and what is recoverable
is the amount of expenditure necessary to restore the dwelling to a
condition in which it is no longer a danger to the health and safety
of persons occupying [it] ... "61
The New Zealand Court of Appeal in Bowen v. Paramount
Builders (Hamilton) Ltd 62 adopted similar reasoning. Bowen was
decided almost contemporaneously with Anns. In Bowen, an action
in negligence was brought against the defendant builder for damages incurred in repairs and restoration when the building subsided
because of inadequate foundations. These costs were characterized
as physical damage with consequent economic loss rather than as
pure economic loss. 63 Once the loss was so labelled, the general
notions of duty of care were employed.' An examination of the
Bowen opinion reveals the court's confidence that the elements of
causation and remoteness of damage in negligence would suffice to
270, 286 (Austl. 1976), citing Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d
530, 550 (1973).
58. Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council, [1972] I Q.B. 373.
59. Id at 396 (Lord Denning, M.R.); cf.id at 404 (Sacks, L.J. considered that the distinction was "fallacious in relation to the exercise of duties and powers by a public authority"); id at 408 (Sacks, L.J. doubted that a claim lay for "any reduction in the market value
of the premises over and above the cost of the relevant work.")
60. Anns v. Merton London Borough Council, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024, 1039.
61. Id
62. Bowen v. Paramount Builders Ltd., [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394.
63. Id at 410, 411, 417. See also Smillie, Liability of.Builders, Manufacturersand Vendorsfor Negligence, 8 N.Z.U.L. REV. 109 (1978).
64. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [19321 A.C. 562.
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restrict recovery to proper grounds.6 5 The difficulty with labelling
damage in this way is that the law has not considered damage to
the article itself as physical injury. For instance, in the Rivtow case,
the Canadian Supreme Court did not consider the flaw in the crane
as constituting physical damage.6 6 Could a defect in a bicycle be
described as "physical damage" in order to hold the manufacturer
responsible to a purchaser in negligence for the cost of repairs?
While this question may be left open under the reasoning of the
above authorities, it would have startling implications for products
liability law. Even bold United States judicial minds have been
unwilling to take this step.67
To this point, Commonwealth authorities have relied on the
presence, threat, or foreseeability of physical damage. They adhered to the exclusory rule to the extent that if no element of physical damage could be found, economic loss would not be
recoverable.
Some authorities in the Commonwealth have gone beyond the
physical damage nexus requirement. In Rivtow, Justice Ritchie,
writing for the majority, found that the British Columbian distributor of the crane owed a duty to warn the plaintiff of its dangerous
condition upon learning of the condition. 6 This duty was derived
by analogy to cases dealing with chattels which are dangerous
,per se. This duty had been breached, thus "exposing [the plaintiff]
to the direct consequence of losing the services of the barge for at
least a month during one of its busiest seasons,"6 9 and economic
loss was allowed "as compensation for the direct and demonstrably
65. Bowen v. Paramount Builders Ltd., [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394, 413, 418.
[T]he ambit of the duty can be effectively controlled only by a strict insistence of
the proximity principle . . . . In other words . . . the duty of the builder is not

owed to anyone who purchases a building with actual knowledge of the defect or in
circumstances where he ought to have used his opportunity of inspection in a way
which would have given him warning of the defect.
Id at 413 (Richmond, J.).
66. See C. MILLER & P. LOVELL, PRODUCT LIABILITY 337 (1977).
67. T.W.A. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 6 N.Y. 749, 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1955), aff'd 153
N.Y.S.2d 546 (1956). Justice Elder states that if manufacturers were subjected to wide negligence liability:
Manufacturers would be subject to indiscriminate lawsuits by persons having no
contractual relations with them, persons who could thereby escape the limitations,
if any, agreed upon in their contract of purchase. Damages for inferior quality, per
se, should be better left to suits between vendors and purchasers since they depend
on the terms of the bargain between them.
148 N.Y.S. at 290. See also Smillie, supra note 63, at 116.
68. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (1973).
69. Id at 537.
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foreseeable result"7 of the breach of duty to warn.
The majority in Rivtow is consistent with the opinion of Lord
Justice Edmund-Davies in Spartan Steel.7 Spartan Steel involved
the question of the recoverability of loss to the plaintiff caused by a
break in the electricity supply to the plaintiff's arc furnace resulting
from the defendant's negligence. Some of the plaintiff's losses were
clearly proximately caused by the physical damage; for example,
the cost of removal of solidified metal to avoid damage to the lining
of the furnace.7 2 The damages in dispute were the loss of profits
flowing from the plaintiff's inability to use the furnaces during the
electrical shutdown.7 3
Lord Justice Edmund-Davies, showing clear impatience,
stated that this case "highlighted a problem regarding which differing judicial and academic views have been expressed and which it
is high time should be finally solved." 74 His Lordship's solution
was that "an action lies in negligence for damages in respect of
purely economic loss, provided that it was a reasonably foreseeable
and direct consequence of failure in a duty of care."'7 5 Thus, his
Lordship's solution relied upon both directness and foreseeability.
Lord Denning, on the other hand, despaired of tests "which
have proved so elusive." 7 6 He stated that "[i]t seems . . . better to
consider the particular relationship in hand, and see whether or
77
not, as a matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable.
Lord Denning then considered the question under five policy considerations: (1) the position of statutory undertakers - that is, the
intention of Parliament in imposing a duty as supplier of electricity;7 8 (2) "[t]he nature of the hazard - namely, the cutting off of the
70. Id at 547.
71. [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 39-46 (dissenting opinion).
72. Electric power to the furnace was needed to melt the metal. The injury to the furnace would have occurred once the metal began to solidify had the plaintiffs not taken alternate steps to melt the metal. The plaintiffs incurred damages when the metal was determined
to be of lesser value due to the alternate melting method. Id at 560.
73. The power failure prevented the plaintiffs from utilizing the furnace for 14 1/2
hours, and the plaintiffs, therefore, lost a profit of £ 1,767. Yd
74. Id at 564.
75. Id at 569.
76. Id at 562.
77. Id
78. But one thing is clear, the board has never been held liable for economic loss
only. If such be the policy of the legislature in regard to electricity boards, it would
seem right for the common law to adopt a similar policy in regard to contractors. If
the electricity boards are not liable for economic loss due to negligence which results in the cutting off of the supply, nor should the contractor be liable.
Id at 563.
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supply of electricity;" 7 9 (3) whether there would be no end of
claims; 8 ° (4) loss distribution;8' and (5) law as the provider for deserving cases. Lord Denning saw recovery of actual physical damage in this light.8 2 He still clung to the consequent damage test
articulated in S.CM. insofar as loss consequent upon physical
damage would more easily fall within the policy guidelines for recovery.8 3 This policy approach, however, has had no impact on
judicial opinion. The Australian High Court in Caltex had occasion to review Spartan Steel, and the reasoning of neither Lord
Denning nor Lord Justice Edmund-Davies found favor in the High
Court.

8 4

II.

UNITED STATES AUTHORITY

The Commonwealth law discussed to this point has been complex and contradictory. In application, the apparent simplicity of
the exclusory rule was not present. These obfuscations diminished
the force of the rule's rationale that it provided a certain limitation
on indeterminate liability. 5
Little has been said of the prevailing doctrine in the United
States. The parallels in United States and Commonwealth law in
this area are not highlighted in clear mutual principles, but in common difficulties, wrongturnings, intricacies, and uncertain stages of
development.
An in-depth exposition of United States law is not herein possible. Hence, the discussion below will be limited to some observations on possible directions of change in the prevailing rule in the
United States.
Commentators in the United States have approached the question of recovery of pure economic loss mainly from the standpoint
of interference with economic relations. 86 Contractual relations assume the overwhelming proportion of economic relations. 87 The
79. Id
80. Id at 564.
81. Id
82. Id
83. Id
84. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 28283 (Stephen, J.), 279 (Gibbs, J.), 291 (Mason, J.) (Austi. 1976).
85. See notes 20-25 supra, and accompanying text.
86. See, e.g., Note, Negligent Interference with Economic Expectancy.- The Case/or Recovery, 16 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1964).
87. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 938 et seq.
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leading case conforming United States law to pre-Caltex Commonwealth law is Robin's Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.8"

In Flint, the United States Supreme Court denied recovery for
a ship charter's loss of use when the defendant negligently damaged
the ship. Justice Holmes considered the general rule to be so well
established that no authority needed to be cited.8 9 This rule held
that "a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the
tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person was
under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the
wrong." 90
Although Dean Prosser has stated that "no very satisfactory
reason has been given for this refusal of a remedy in negligence
cases," 91 and that the policy restricting recovery may be "expected
to move in the future in the direction of recovery by those whose
damages are foreseeable by the actor," 92 he concluded that "[tihere
is actually, however, very little looking even vaguely in this direction." 93 While this may still be true, there have been developments
that indicate a trend towards liberalizing recovery of pure economic loss.
The first decision of note is that of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen.94 In this case, commercial
fishermen brought an action for damages consisting of profits lost
as a result of a loss in fishing potential caused by the Santa Barbara, California oil spill in 1969. Since the plaintiffs had no proprietary rights in the fishing grounds, the exclusory rule was
immediately relevant. As Judge Sneed stated: "Defendants drew
support by pointing to the widely recognized principle that no
cause of action lies against a defendant whose negligence prevents
the plaintiff from obtaining a prospective pecuniary advantage." 95
The court in Union Oil reviewed past authority and, importantly for the relevance of this article, cited Commonwealth opinion. The court found that the defendants owed a duty of care and
hence allowed recovery of the economic losses. The main reason
88. 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
89. Id at 309.
90. Id
91. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 940.
92. Id

93. Id
94. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
95. Id at 563.
96. Id at 566.
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for the court's decision to allow recovery was the foreseeability of
damage. 97 Moreover, in looking to the factors isolated by the Cali-

fornia Supreme Court in Biakanja v. Irving,98 the Ninth Circuit
confirmed the requisite duty:99 "Thus, the fact that the injury flows
directly from the action of escaping oil on the life in the sea. . . the
public's deep disapproval of injuries to the environment and the

strong policy of preventing such injuries, all point to the existence
of a required duty."l From an economic analysis perspective, the
court reached the same conclusion.' 0 '
The court in Union Oil was fearful of the possibility of indeterminate liability. This fear was expressed in the court's insistence on
strict proof of damages 0 2 and the limitation of the holding to none
others except "commercial fishermen, whose economic or personal
affairs were discommoded by the oil spill . . ."103 In its conclusion, Union Oil is equivocal in its regard of the exclusory rule. In
this respect, the potential impact of the case goes far beyond its
narrow holding. As one commentator noted, "Finally, although the
Ninth Circuit neither expressly rejected the general rule nor expressly created another exception to it, this decision cannot help but
further depreciate the pre.cedential value of the rule and play an

important part in opening a vast area of tort liability damages."" °

The exclusory rule, however, has proved to be fairly resilient.
In Adams v. Southern Pacic TransportationCompany,1 5 an intermediate California appellate court followed the California
Supreme Court decision in Ffield Manor v. Finston'0 6 by finding
97. Id at 568.
98. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
99. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 569 (9th Cir. 1974).
While it is true that the earlier decision of the California Supreme Court in
Biakanja does not accord 'foreseeability of the risk' the commanding position
which it was afforded in Dillon v. Legg, we cannot escape the conclusion that under
California law the presence of a duty on the part of the defendants in this case
would turn substantially on foreseeability.
Id
100. Id
101. In the court's determination, the defendants were in a superior position to withstand
liability. Id at 569-70. For a discussion of the court's decision, including policy factors, see
Comment, supra note 4, at 317-19 (1974).
102. Damages "must be established with certainty and must not be remote, speculative or
conjectural." Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974); accord, Dunlop
Tire & Rubber Corp. v. FMC Corp., 385 N.Y.S.2d 971, 974-75 (1976). See also MacMillan
Bloedel Ltd. v. The Foundation Co. of Canada, 74 D.L.R.3d 294, 299-300 (B.C. S. Ct. 1977).
103. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974).
104. Comment, supra note 4, at 327.
105. 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216 (1975).
106. 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 7 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1960). FoleldManor refused to
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that no cause of action was stated when the plaintiff employees lost
their jobs because of the alleged negligence of the defendants in

.handling bombs which destroyed the plant in which they worked.
In reaching his conclusion, Judge Friedman criticized Ffield
Manor, but felt constrained to follow it. In a closely reasoned
opinion," 7 his Honor attempted to demonstrate that the basis of
the duty issue in Fifleld Manor was weakened by a change in judicial technique dictated by Dillon v. Legg. 0 8 At the risk of oversimplification, the court reasoned that the court in Dillon had held that
a duty of care is determined by proximity of the parties, and that

any policy reasons must function so as to restrict that established
duty of care.' 09 Judge Friedman stated that it was reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiffs would suffer loss; thus, a duty of care initially arose. The court would then "balance the risk of loss factors
to affirm or negate a duty of care running from the defendant to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's class." ' l
The dicta of Judge Friedman in the Adams case represents a
further assault on the exclusory rule. While the reasoning of the
court in Union Oil and the dicta of Judge Friedman in Adams are
frontal attacks on the exclusory rule, other authorities have avoided
the rule altogether by finding liability outside the law of negliallow a cause of action for economic loss based on alleged negligent conduct. The court
reasoned that any other result would constitute an unwarranted extension of liability for
negligence. Id at 636-37, 354 P.2d at 1075, 7 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
107. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 41-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216,
218-21 (1975).
108. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
109. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 41-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216,
218-21 (1975). See Rondel v. Worsley, [1969] A.C. 191 and Saif Ali v. Sydney Mitchell &
Co., [1978] 3 All E.R. 1033, for an exposition of policy factors defining a barrister's duty of
care to a client.
110. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 221
(1975). See Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] N.Z.L.R. 553 (N.Z. Ct. App.):
The mere absence of precedent will not be enough to protect the defendant. In
addition, if there is a prima facie relationship of the sort propounded by Lord Atkin
(in Donoghue v. Stevenson), the plaintiff will no longer have to persuade the court
by some sort of proleptic exercise that there can be no adequate reason for relieving
such a defendant of the duty of care that otherwise the defendant must accept.
Instead it will be for the defendant to accept that task and show affirmatively that
there are good and valid considerations which require that the duty should be excluded in the situation under review.
Id (Woodhouse, J.). See also id at 583 (Cooke, J.). For a commentary regarding the individual judgments in Scott Group, see Note, Negligent Misstatement - Auditor's Liability to
Third Partiesfor CarelessReport on Company's AnnualAccounts, 8 N.Z.U.L. REV. 175, 17981 (1978).
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gence.'" Furthermore, some authorities have relied on the special
status of the plaintiffs' 2 or special relations analogous to "common
adventure ' to avoid the rule. Academic comment in the United
States preponderantly favors recoverability of damages for pure
economic loss." 4
When Caltex was decided, there existed a highly contradictory
and complex body of Anglo-American case law and an active debate both within those authorities and among writers about the exclusory rule. To the credit of the High Court of Australia, the court
took notice of this ferment in setting the law in Australia on a new
path.
III.

THE CALTEX CASE

In the Caltex case, a pipeline owned by Australian Oil Refining Pty. Ltd. (AOR) connected an oil refinery on the southern shore
of Botany Bay, in Sydney, to an oil terminal belonging to the
Caltex company on the northern shore. Caltex had no proprietary
interest in the pipeline. The defendant dredge "Willemstad" fractured this pipe. An action sounding in negligence was commenced
in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. An action was also
brought against Decca Survey Australia Ltd. (Decca) for negligently plotting the chart upon which the defendant dredge relied.
Damages claimed by Caltex included the expense incurred in
obtaining alternative means to transport the oil, the cost of sending
low sulphur oil to another terminal, the modifications to terminals,
certain harbour dues, and other miscellanea. The quantum of
damages was stipulated to be $95,000.00. The Supreme Court of
New South Wales allowed no damages to the Caltex company for
the claimed economic loss suffered as a result of the severing of the
pipeline. " 15
On appeal, the High Court was asked to determine whether
111.

For example, in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), the court

found recovery based on a quasi third party beneficiary theory. Id at 650, 320 P.2d at 18-19.
112. Carbone v. Ursich, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953) (crew members of a fishing vessel
may bring an action for lost profits against another vessel which negligently damages fishing
nets).
113. See generally Morrison Steamship v. Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) Ltd., [1947]
A.C. 265; Aktieselskabet Cuzco v. The Sucarseco, 294 U.S. 394 (1934).
114. In addition to references previously cited, see Comment, Foreseeabilityof ThirdPartyEconomic Injuries-4 Problem in Analysis, 20 U. CHI. L. REV. 283 (1953); Carpenter,
Inteiference with ContractualRelations, 41 HARV. L. REV. 728 (1928). For a particularly
cogent argument favoring recovery, see Note, supra note 86.
115. Unreported.
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the exclusory rule should be applied to deny Caltex recovery of the

pure economic loss."1 6 Because of the diversity of viewpoints
among the judges, a brief survey of their views will be helpful.
A.

The Individual Judgments

Justice Gibbs found that while the exclusory rule was gener-

ally applicable, it did not preclude the plaintiff from recovery in the
present circumstances." 7 Justices Stephen, Mason, Jacobs, and
Murphy found that the exclusory rule as traditionally posed was

not the law in Australia." Justice Mason proposed the following
test: "A defendant will then be liable for economic damage due to
his negligent conduct when he can reasonably foresee that a specific
individual, as distinct from a general class of persons, will suffer.
financial loss as a consequence of his conduct."' 'I Justice Jacobs
reasoned that the duty of care
was that owed to a person whose property was in such physical
propinquity to the place where the acts or omissions of the
dredge and Decca had their physical effect that a physical effect
on the property of that120person was foreseeable as the result of
such acts or omissions.

Justice Murphy simply reasoned that he did not accept the
contention that "economic loss not connected with physical damage
to the plaintiff's property is not recoverable."'' His Honor did not
attempt to formulate a test to limit the possible width of recovery
and, as such, contrasted with the opinions of his colleagues who
were at pains to find limiting formulations. Hence, the reasoning of
116. Subsidiary issues before the High Court on appeal were: (1) whether the captain of
the dredge should have judgment entered against him; this was unanimously dismissed.
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 273-74, 290,
294-95, 298 (Austl. 1976); and (2) whether Decca was immune from liability because of the
intervening negligence of the navigators of the dredge. The High Court found that no norms
actus interveniens was shown and that the negligence of both defendants was a concurrent
cause of the damage. Id at 274-75 (Gibbs, J.), 290 (Stephen, J.). This finding is consistent
with a line of authority showing a judicial disinclination to find that actions of third parties
may constitute a norus actus interveniens so as to immunize a tortfeasor. from liability in
negligence. See Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [19701 A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
117. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 271
(Austl. 1976).
118. Id at 284 (Stephen, J.), 292 (Mason, J.), 295 (Jacobs, J.), 299 (Murphy, J.).
119. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 293
(Austl. 1976).
120. Id at 298.
121. Id at 299.
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Justice Murphy is outside the mainstream of opinion exhibited in
the Caltex case.
Justice Stephen delivered possibly the most important opinion,
which provided a very thorough review of the law, as well as the
policy underlying it.' 2 2 It is not, however, an easy opinion from
which to distill a ratio decidendi. He found no rule of universal
application that could be discovered and found that the law insisted
"upon sufficient proximity between tortious act and compensable
detriment."' 23 Justice Stephen continued:
The articulation, through the cases, of circumstances which denote sufficient proximity will provide a body of precedent productive of the necessary certainty, the gradual accumulation of
decided cases and the impact of evolving policy considerations
will reflect the courts' assessment of the
demands of society for
124
protection from carelessness of others.
On his case by case evaluation, Justice Stephen quoted Chief
Justice Barwick of the High Court of Australia in Mutual Life &
Citizens' Assurance Co. v. Evatt. 1 25 Mutual Lfe held that the elements of the relationship out of which a duty of care would be imposed by law "will be elucidated in the course of time as particular
facts are submitted for consideration in cases coming forward for
decision."'' 26 These principles comport closely with the developing
American
doctrine as articulated by Justice Friedman in the Adams
7
2

case. 1

The facts that led to Justice Stephen's conclusion that sufficient
proximity existed were: (1) the defendant's knowledge that the
property damaged . . . was a kind inherently likely, when damaged, to be productive of consequential economic loss to those who
rely directly upon its use; there was here something akin to a "common adventure;"12 1 (2) the defendant's knowledge or means of
122. Id at 280-87.
123. Id at 287.
124. Id at 287 (Stephen, J.), citing Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., 11964]
A.C. 465 (H.L.) and Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1058 (H.L.). See
also Glass, Duty to Avoid Economic Loss, 51 AUSTL. L.J. 372, 384-85 (1977); Adams v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 41-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216, 218-21 (1975),
citing Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (en banc
1968) and Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669, 679-80, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765, 775-76 (en banc 1974).
125. [19711 A.C. 792.
126. Id
127. Adams v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 50 Cal. App. 3d 37, 41-45, 123 Cal. Rptr. 216,
218-21 (1975).
128. See note 44 supra.
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knowledge of the pipeline and its use; (3) the infliction of damage
by the defendant to the property of a third party in breach of duty
of care owed to that third party; (4) the nature of the detriment
suffered by the plaintiff; and (5) the nature of the damages claimed
reflecting loss of use, representing not some loss of profits arising
because collateral commercial arrangements are adversely affected,
but the direct consequence of the detriment suffered. 129 Justice Stephen proposed an amalgam based upon policy factors added to a
130
moral dimension. This will be discussed below.
Justice Gibbs found that the Caltex company could recover on
the basis that the facts established an exception to the exclusory
rule. 13 This was a case, he said,
in which the defendant had knowledge or means of knowledge
that the plaintiff individually, not merely as a member of an unascertained class, will be likely to suffer economic loss as a contake
sequence of his negligence, and owes the plaintiff a duty 1to
32
act.
negligent
his
by
damage
such
him
cause
to
not
care
Justice Gibbs indicated that exceptions may eventually overtake
the exclusory rule, but that any formulation of a novel rule must
await judicial exposition on a case by case basis. 33 In his view, it
was material "that some property of the plaintiff was in physical
proximity to the damaged property" and that "the plaintiff, and the
person whose
property was injured, were engaged in a common ad34
venture." 1
The effect of the Caltex case is to abolish the exclusory rule in
Australia. The High Court's rationale was that the rule was arbitrary and unresponsive to underlying policy reasons, thus restrict135
ing recovery for pure economic loss within a narrow compass.
The court recognized that the exclusory rule was a creature of the
Cardozian nightmare: "liability in an indeterminate amount, for
an indeterminate time, to an indeterminate class."' 136 Thus, the
availability of recovery for economic loss where the loss could be
129. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
(Austl. 1976).
130.

See text accompanying notes 143-153 infra.

131. Id at 287.
132. Id
133. Id
134. Id
135. Id at 284, 286, 293.
136. Id at 284. The language was derived from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931). See also Seavey, Mr. Justice
Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 400 (1939).
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tied to physical damage engaged the courts in a search to find that
element of proprietary right in damaged goods.137 It followed that
a charterer by demise could recover for loss of use of the ship, while
a time charterer could not. 138 Along similar lines, Justice Stephen
pointed out that if the Caltex company had had a possessory right
in the pipeline, which it may have had under contract, it could have
recovered within the bounds of the exclusory rule. The ability to
recover, then, turns on a factor which has no relationship to the
underlying policy reasons of the rule. In other words, recovery
turns on a completely arbitrary factor.
Justice Stephen commented that the maintenance of the exclusory rule was a high price to pay "for protection against the fear of
possibly excessive extension of the right to recover compensation
for a proved lOSS."'1 39 The rule was accordingly found to be inappropriate. The question then remained: what principles should be
applied that would accommodate the demands of policy in generally restricting recovery, while allowing it in proper areas? The
success of the High Court in formulating these principles is questionable.
B. The Applicable Formula
If policy was to be the determinative factor in the equation,
Lord
there existed within the then existing armory of 4authority
Denning's direct policy approach in Spartan Steel. ° In this case,
Lord Denning reasoned that it was "better to consider the particular relationship in hand and see whether or not, as a matter of policy, economic loss should be recoverable ....
The High Court in Caltex rejected this policy approach. Justice Stephen recognized that "no doubt [policy considerations] play
a very significant part in any judicial definition of liability and entitlement in a new area of law."' 42 But he reasoned that the "process
should. . . result in some definition of rights and duties, which can
137.
1877).
(C.A.).
138.
139.
(Austl.
140.
141.
142.
(Austl.

This rule stems from Simpson v. Thompson, [1877] 3 App. Cas. 279, 289 (H.L.
It was applied in Elliott Steam Tug Co. v. Shipping Controller, [1922] 1 K.B. 127
See generally Feldthusen, supra note 3, at 41-42; Atiyah, supra note 3, at 266-67.
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 284
1976).
Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 37-39.
Id at 37.
Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 284
1976).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979

23

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 19
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 9

then be applied to the case in hand, and to subsequent cases, with
relative certainty." 4 3 To adopt Lord Denning's thesis would be to
"invite uncertainty and judicial diversity.""' Justice Gibbs considered that while it was necessary to look at the particular relationship at hand, he did not think that "the law leaves it entirely to the
court to decide as a matter of policy whether the economic loss
should be recoverable."' 4 5
The dilemma is thus posed: policy will mold any test of
recoverability of economic loss, but the use of policy on an ad hoc
basis, while making the law responsive to policy, would invite the
evil of uncertainty. A rule or test was necessary which, Justice Stephen states, "must depend upon policy considerations just as does
the conclusion that for cases of economic loss such an additional
control mechanism is necessary."14' 6 As noted above, Justices Mason and Gibbs articulated firm tests which certainly will aid in similar factual contexts,' 4 7 while Justice Jacobs formulated an
idiosyncratic test that depends on "physical affect," a departure
from the views of his fellow justices.' 4 8
The opinion of Justice Stephen is the most significant in that it
is prospective in nature. His opinion forms a jurisprudential
roadmap for the future. In this sense, his opinion is similar to
Donoghue v. Stevenson"' or Home Office v. Dorset Yacht,' 5 0 in that
his views are cast with the future development of the law in
mind. 5 ' As noted above, Justice Stephen enumerated factors
which in this case were productive of the duty of care.' 52
On a more generalized plane, Justice Stephen considered the
fundamental factor determining recovery to be whether recovery is
143. Id
144. Id
145. Id at 279 (emphasis added).
146. Id at 287.
147. See notes 119 & 132 supra, and accompanying text.
148. See note 120 supra, and accompanying text.
149. Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562.
150. Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., (19701 A.C. 1004 (H.L.).
151. See Stevens, supra note 3, at 448-66.
152. See note 129 supra, and accompanying text. The concept of moral blame was listed
as a factor on which to base recovery in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16
(1958). The California Supreme Court listed the following factors:
[T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of
preventing future harm.
Id at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
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"fair and reasonable."' 5 3 After quoting Lord Atkin in Dono-

ghue, 5 4 that liability for negligence "is no doubt based upon a general sentiment of moral wrongdoing for which the offender must
pay," he continues: "Such a sentiment will only be present when
there exists a degree of proximity between the tortious act and the
injury such that the community will recognize the tortfeasor as being in justice obliged to make good his moral wrongdoing by com-

' 155
pensating the victims of his negligence."

The question of whether the community would in justice expect liability to be placed on the defendant will overshadow policy

reasons such as avoidance of unlimited liability, possibility of speculative claims,' 56 potential administrative problems, 157 and economic allocation of resources.1 5 8 In the final analysis, this must
depend upon what the courts consider community expectations to
be.15 9 This may be conveniently called the justice or moral dimension.
The flaw in the High Court's decision appears at this point.
Although Justice Stephen realized the need, when embarking on a
new path, to alleviate the inevitable uncertainties, he left only partial and uncertain direction for future decisionmaking. Future de-

cisions in this area will be based on two principle factors - the fear
of indeterminate liability and the justice or moral dimension.

However, this superficial analysis will undoubtedly inspire uncertainty, the very vice the court sought to avoid and for which Lord
Denning was criticized. 60 Indeed, it is highly questionable
whether the court's moral dimension is more certain than the appli153. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
(Austi. 1976), quoting Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co., [1970] A.C. 1004, 1058 (H.L.) (Morris, L.).
154. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
(Austl. 1976), quoting Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562, 580.
155. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
(Austl. 1976).
156. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 563 (9th Cir. 1974).
157. Stevens, supra note 3, at 450-53.
158. Note, supra note 86, at 681-84; Comment, supra note 4, at 326-27. In the Caltex
case, however, Justice Stephen expressed doubts as to the appropriateness of a court's consideration of loss distribution. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51
A.L.J.R. 270, 289 (Austl. 1976).
159. See Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958); see also note 152
supra.
160. Justice Stephen was particularly concerned with the difficulty of this approach, citing "the wide range of matters thus thrown open to judicial consideration .. " Caltex Oil
(Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 283 (Austl. 1976). This
method would "lead to great uncertainty in the law ... ." Id
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cation of Lord Denning's policy factors enunciated in Spartan
Steel.
Clearly, Lord Denning's public policy approach in Spartan
Steel is unsatisfactory, because he fails to formulate from these policy considerations a rule that is useful to the courts and legal advisors. Indeed, these policy factors are presented in a haphazard and
drawn on an ad hoc basis from
undisciplined fashion.' 6 ' They 16are
2
case.
particular
the
of
the facts
Uncertainty is introduced not by express weighing of policy
factors but by the manner in which these factors are weighed. In
this context, certainty is the ability to predict how a court will make
a decision. In any area of the law, the parameters of that law are
made definite by a growing body of case law. In the absence of
parameters drawn in this wa'Y, express articulation of how policy
will be used would give insight into the decisionmaking process.
The factors of morality and justice articulated in Caltex provide
little guidance. On the other hand, to set forth policy factors in
terms of an interest analysis would demonstrate how the courts will
use these factors and lead to a greater degree of certainty.
Application of an interest analysis in Caltex would have involved a balancing of the relevant policy factors in terms of the
competing interests of all of the parties involved.' 63 The Caltex
company's interest was to carry on its business free from negligent
acts causing economic harm. 16 The defendants had a legitimate
interest in conducting their business with a maximum degree of
freedom without excessive burdens placed on them by way of liability in negligence. 65 Clearly, the community at large had an interest in an orderly relationship between the plaintiff and
defendants. 166 Hence, four social policies can be identified in the
161. See notes 78-83 supra, and accompanying text.
162. For instance, he stressed the fact that there was a break in the supply of electricity
and observed that "most people are content to take the risk on themselves ....

[T]hey put

up with it. They try to make up the economic loss by doing more work next day." Spartan
Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors), [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 38.
163. See generally Green, RelationalInterests, 30 ILL. L. REV. 1, 4 (1935); SALMOND ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 203 (17th ed. R.F.V. Heuston 1974). For an analysis using interests-tobe-protected as an aid to judicial decisionmaking in tort cases, see Treece, Leon Green and
the JudicialProcess.- Government of the People, by the People,andfor the People, 56 TEXAS L.
REV. 447, 458 (1978). "The point of Green's organization is to aid analysis, and its elasticity
guarantees its continued usefulness as a description of the tort process." Id
164. See Note, supra note 86, at 675.
165. Id at 676.
166. Id See also Stevens, supra note 3, at 448-66.
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Caltex case: (1) the stabilization of economic relations; (2) the
preservation of freedom of action; (3) the distribution of economic
losses; 7and (4) the discouragement of waste and negligent con6
duct. 1
1. The Stabilizationof Economic Relations. The maintenance
of contractual relations is the most important factor in the stability
of economic relations. Parties act, adjust their mutual relationship,
and allocate resources to comport with contractual obligations. A
decision or rule that undermines these obligations will have a destabilizing effect. Thus, if an act of negligence forces a breach of
contract, a right to recover against the negligent actor will tend to
promote economic stability by realizing as far as possible the original contractual expectations.
2. The Preservationof Freedom of Action. Society, as well as
the particular actors, has an interest in ensuring that participants in
that society be able to conduct their affairs without undue inhibitions. Initiative should not be frozen by fear of undue burdens in
68
damage awards. 1
3. The Distribution ofEconomic Losses. Society values an efficient allocation of resources. The law of negligence has been
much influenced by the desire to distribute losses to those with the
superior capacity to bear them.16 9 In the majority of cases, the
mode of distribution is through the insurance system. In some
cases, an economic analysis is expressly employed which brings to
bear questions of loss distribution. In Australia, the loss distribution interest is disfavored. In Caltex, for example, Justice Stephen
doubted the desirability of its consideration. He stated that "[tihe
task of the courts remains that of lossfixing rather than loss spreading and [that] if this is to be altered [it] is . . .a matter for direct
167. Note, supra note 86, at 676-79.
168. The so-called crisis in medical malpractice may be seen in part as a restriction of
freedom of the doctor flowing from fear of litigation. This leads to the evils of defensive
medicine, unnecessary diagnostic tests and increased costs caused by high insurance premiums. Kretzmer, The MalpracticeSuit.- Is it Needed?, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 55, 62 (1973).
See also Comment, Alternatives to the Medical MalpracticePhenomenon. Damage Limitations, Malpractice Review Panels and Countersuits, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1179 (1977);
Note, MedicalMalpracticeArbitration: A ComparativeAnalysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285 (1976);
Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat.- A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971 DUKE L.J.
939.
169. Griffiths v. Kerkemeyer, 51 A.L.J.R. 792, 796 (Austl. 1976). See also Launchbury v.
Morgans, [1971] 2 Q.B. 245 (Lord Denning, M.R.), rev'd [1973] A.C. 127.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1979

27

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1979], Art. 19
CALIFORNIA WESTERN

INTERNATIONAL

LAW JOURNAL

legislative action rather than for the courts."' 7

Vol. 9

0

4. Discouragement of Waste and Negligent Conduct. Although the effectiveness of negligence liability as a deterrent to negligent conduct is dubious, 17 1 courts continue to have faith in its
force. 172 It is likely that a good deal of the moral dimension of
Justice Stephen's policy analysis is subsumed by the interest in deterrence. Even if the deterrence factor is absent, the court may feel
compelled to register its disapproval of the conduct in question. An
outstanding example of this is found in the Union Oil case.' 7 3
"[Tihe fact that the injury flows directly from the action of escaping
oil on the life of the sea, . . . the public's deep disapproval of injusuch
ries to the environment and the strong policy of preventing
1 74
injuries, all point to the existence of a required duty."'
Parties' interests in any given case will be in conflict. This interplay can be gleaned from the Caltex case. To oppose the imposition of liability and hence to allow the loss to rest where it fell
would serve the interests of preservation of freedom of action and
distribution of economic losses. However, little weight could be
ascribed to the former - preservation of freedom of action - since
liability refers to a single act of negligence, and damages do not
extend to remote consequences. 7" As to the latter - distribution
of economic losses - the fact that Caltex was covered with loss
insurance defeats the argument that a finding of liability would
spread the losses, since loss insurance is more efficient in spreading
losses in most circumstances. 17 6 On the other hand, while the stabilization of economic relations is of little importance in Caltex, discouragement of waste and negligent conduct are important. The
action of the defendant was clearly negligent. The possible ramifications of negligence were known to the defendant. Moreover, the
magnitude of the damage could be ascertained and the negligent
conduct was of no countervailing social value.
170.
(Austl.
171.
172.
173.

Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
1976).
Blum & Kalven, supra note 26, at 251-66.
G. WILLIAMS & B. HEPPLE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORT 118 elseq. (1976).
Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).

174. Id at 569.
175. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 287
(Austl. 1976).

176. Alexander, The Law of Tort and Non-PhysicalLoss. InsuranceAspects, 12 J. Soc'y
PUB. TCHRS. L. 119, 120 (1972).
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE CALTEX CASE IN AUSTRALIA

A.

PhysicalNexus Cases

The effect of the Caltex case is to call into question those cases
that relied expressly or impliedly on the exclusory rule. Thus, the
rule enunciated by Lord Denning in S, CM. - that economic loss
truly consequential upon physical damage may be recovered - is
no longer good law in Australia.'7 7 Caltex also requires a reexamination of those cases that turned on the characterization of damage
as physical rather than pure economic loss. For instance, in Dutton, 178 Anns, 179 and Bowen, 180 the respective courts characterized
the cost of repair and restoration-of buildings caused by the defendants' negligence as economic loss flowing from the physical damage
to the dwellings themselves rather than pure economic loss. In so
doing, the duty of care was framed in accordance with the Atkinian
test in Donoghue v. Stevenson,' which the Caltex court found to
be inadequate to control the area of possible recovery where the
loss suffered was economic loss.' 8 2 Of course, the presence of physical damage will be highly material within the Caltex formula1 83
tion.
Justice Laskin in Rivtow also posed a test that relied upon
threatened damage.1 84 This decision must now be subject to the
Caltex case in Australia. The presence of threatened physical danger will be relevant but not determinative in ascertaining whether
the necessary degree of proximity exists.
B.

Directness and Knowledge Cases

The approach suggested by Lord Justice Edmund-Davies in
Spartan Steel'185 and by the majority opinion in Rivtow1 86 was also
rejected in the Caltex decision. That approach based recovery of
177. Walker, Negligent Acts- Recoveryfor Economic Loss, [1978] N.Z.L.J. 46, 47.
178. Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council, [19721 1 Q.B. 373.
179. Arms v. Merton London Borough Council, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 1024.
180. Bowen v. Paramount Builders (Hamilton) Ltd., [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394 (N.Z. Ct.
App.).
181. [1932] A.C. 562.
182. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 293
(Mason, J.) (Austl. 1976).
183. id at 279 (Gibbs, J.), 287 (Stephen, J.).
184. See note 53 supra, and accompanying text.
185. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co. (Contractors) Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 27, 3946.
186. Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (1973).
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economic loss on the basis of directness of damage and knowledge
of the defendant.
In Caltex, Justice Gibbs said of Lord Justice Edmund-Davies'
view, "I cannot find this approach altogether satisfactory."' 7 Although Justice Mason concluded that his test was consistent with
the majority in Rivtow, he strongly disapproved of the "directness"
test, which he said harkened back to the pre- Wagon-Mound era. 88
Justice Stephen cited Rivtow and Hedley Byrne as examples of situations in which formulations to limit may be fashioned. 8 9 Earlier
in his opinion, Justice Stephen referred to Riviow as a case of rather
"special circumstances involving products liability."' 90 Both Justice Stephen and Justice Gibbs, however, cited Riviow as establishing the importance of the knowledge of the defendant in
determining the requisite proximity for recovery of the economic
loss claimed in Caltex. In sum, directness of damage and knowledge of the defendant is not a sufficient basis for recovery of pure
economic loss, although both factors will remain highly relevant
under the Caltex principles.
C

Common Adventure

The exception to the exclusory rule enunciated in Greystoke
Castle 9 ' is preserved by the Caltex case. The court accepted the
dicta of Lord Roche as exemplifying a situation where the proximity between the cargo owner and the tortfeasor is close enough to
allow recovery. 192 This springs from the common adventure element that the property of the owner of the goods - the plaintiff and the vehicle owner were subject to the same risks. 193 The common adventure element itself provides a limiting test that checks
the possibility of indeterminate liability. 9 4
D.

Negligent Misstatement

Hedley Byrne v. Heller'9 5 was cited in Caltex as authority for
187.
(Austl.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 279
1976).
Id at 293.
Id at 287.
Id at 281.
Id at 278-80, 288.
Id at 279 (Gibbs, J.), 285 (Stephen, J.).
Id But see id at 297 (Jacobs, J.).
See note 50 supra.
Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.).
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the proposition that the law of negligence had opened the door to
recovery of pure economic loss. The High Court relied heavily on.
the utility of the "special relationship" requirement in Hedey
Byrne as obviating the Cardozian nightmare of unbounded liability.' 96 Hence, the Caltex court has confirmed the importance of the
special relationship requirement. This should prevent any development in the law of negligent misstatement to base liability on mere
notions of foreseeability.19 7
The law of negligent misstatement should now parallel liability for negligent conduct resulting in economic loss. That is, it
should develop with close judicial attention to the fear of indeterminate liability and community expectations of justice and morality. Indeed, the Canadian Supreme Court needed no prodding
from its Australian counterpart in deciding in Haig v. Bamford'9 8
the scope of an auditor's liability in negligence to parties other than
his client. In Haig, Justice Dickson rejected, on the basis of possible indeterminate liability, the argument that the test should be one
of mere foreseeability.199 Moreover, the court considered the public role of auditors and their function in society as crucial.2 "° This
status 20 ' led to an increased responsibility that was reflected in their
liability, which was determined according to what the public
should expect of auditors in their public role. This approach
closely parallels the moral dimension in Justice Stephen's opin20 2
ion.
The importance of this development in the law of negligent
misstatement is that it introduces a dynamic element - that is, the
196. Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge "Willemstad," 51 A.L.J.R. 270, 277
(Gibbs, J.), 286 (Stephen, J.), 291 (Mason, J.) (Austl. 1976).
197. See note 34 supra, and accompanying text. One exception involves the liability of
local authorities where a separate body of law is developing based upon general foreseeability notions of proximity. Id, citing Dutton v. Bognor Regis Urban Dist. Council, [1972] 1
Q.B. 373 and Ministry Hous. & Local Gov't v. Sharp, [197012 Q.B. 223. But see Glass, supra
note 124, at 380 and Phegan, Tort Liability of Local Authorities 6-7 (1978) (unpublished
thesis available with the Comm. for Post-Graduate Studies, Law Department, University of
Sydney). In the United States the general foreseeability test has been applied in cases concerning advice given by public officers. See Mulroy v. Wright, 240 N.W. 116 (Minn. 1931);
Commonwealth for Use of Green v. Johnson, 96 S.W. 801 (Ky. Ct. App. 1906); Buszta v.
Souther, 232 A.2d 396 (R.I. 1967); Vandewater & Lapp v. Sacks Builders, 186 N.Y.S. 2d 103
(App. Div. 1959) (information on public record).
198. 72 D.L.R.3d 68 (1977).
199. Id at 74-75.
200. Id at 74.
201. See Gilling, Auditors and Their Role in Society- The Legal Concept of Status, 4
A.B.L.R. 88 (1976).
202. See note 155 supra, and accompanying text.
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scope of liability will depend on changing societal norms. Although the High Court can be criticized for introducing an element

of uncertainty, it has firmly established for Australian courts that
the law should be stimulated, on the one hand, by community expectations and restrained, on the other, by a desire to avoid the
possibility of indeterminate liability. Thus, the law of negligent
misstatement should develop in the direction indicated in Haig v.
Bamford. An auditor's liability should not be limited to situations
where that auditor knows both the particular recipient of the information and the particular transaction in which the information is to
be used. Rather, it should be extended to situations where the audi-

tor has knowledge of particular classes of recipients and transactions.2 o3
E.

Products Liability

The endorsement of Justice Laskin's dissent in Rivtow by Lord
Wilberforce in Anns was seen as support for a more general recovery in tort of economic loss caused by negligently manufactured
products. 2° It was reasoned that if, for instance, a motor vehicle
was negligently manufactured so as to endanger the purchaser's
person or property, economic loss for the cost of repairs should be
recoverable from the manufacturer in an action in negligence. The
manufacturer's duty of care was to all persons who may foreseeably
be injured, which will include purchasers who are not in a contractual relationship with the manufacturer.
This reasoning as it relies on the exclusory rule is inconsistent
with the Caltex case. The Caltex decision will direct Australian
203. See Brown, Haig v. Bamford, 15 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 474, 484 (1977). The New
Zealand Court of Appeal in Scott Group Ltd. v. McFarlane, [1978] 1 N.Z.L.R. 553, recently
handed down an important decision relating to the liability for negligent misstatement of
auditors to third parties. In this case, the law is clearly extended on policy reasons to the
limits suggested in the text. Id at 566 (Richmond, P.). But see id. at 574 (Woodhouse, J.):
The issue has been made increasingly complex by the successive and varying formulas that have been used in an effort to confine the general area of responsibility,
in particular for negligent words or in respect of purely economic losses. At this
initial stage at least it should be possible to remove some degree of uncertainty...
by a comprehensible and straightforward test of foreseeability.
Id at 574. In strikingly similar fashion to Justice Stephen in Caltex, Justice Woodhouse was
reluctant to prescribe any general limiting tests. His Honor listed the factors present in the
case productive of the responsibility of the defendant to the plaintiff for the negligent misstatement. Id at 575.
204. See Wallace, Tort Demolishes Contract in New Construction, 94 L.Q. REV. 60, 66-72
(1978); WADDAMS, supra note 27, at 26-37; for a resumd of American cases, see MILLER &
LOVELL, supra note 66, at 338-42 (1977).
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courts to view products liability more broadly, and hence note will
be taken of the following obstacles to recovery of economic loss.

First, the notion of the limits of tortious liability vis-bi-vis contractual liability;20 5 and second, increased legislative activity 20 6 granting remedies to aggrieved consumers - both of these will inhibit
recovery in negligence for economic loss.

The application of an "interest" analysis may give more insight. The area of products liability lends itself to economic analysis. 20 7 Generally, the manufacturer and not the consumer is
invariably the superior loss bearer. This would ordinarily favor lia-

bility in negligence.20 8 The loss spreading argument, however, is
less persuasive in the case of economic loss than it is in the case of
personal or property damage caused by a defective product. It is

generally assumed that safety of products is enhanced by placing
liability for unsafe products on the manufacturer. When economic
loss, and not safety, is involved, the deterrence basis of liability is
absent. 20 9 Furthermore, the insurability of consequential economic
loss is dubious. Risk distribution among a manufacturer's customers may inequitably increase the price of products to the vast bulk

of customers. If liability is found and thus a spreading of the loss
205. See Rivtow Marine Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, 40 D.L.R.3d 530, 536-40, 54546 (1973). See also Fridman, The Interaction of Tort and Contract, 93 L.Q. REV. 422, 426
(1977); Wallace, supra note 204. Several cases have tested the pre-contractual negligent misstatement. See, e.g., Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801 (C.A.); Dillingham
Constructions Pty. v. Downs, [1972] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 49; Presser v. Caldwell Estates Pty., [1971]
2 N.S.W.L.R. 471; Capital Motors Ltd. v. Beecham, [1975] 1 N.Z.L.R. 576. For academic
comments see, e.g., Greig, Misrepresentationsand Sales of Goods, 87 L.Q. REV. 179 (1971);
McLauchlan, Pre-ContractNegligent Misrepresentation,4 OTAGO L. REV. 23 (1977). For an
American view, see Note, Manufacturers'Liabilityto Remote Purchasersfor "'EconomicLoss"
Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539 (1966).
206. Law Reform (Manufacturers Warranties) Ordinance, 1977, No. 12 (Austl.). See the
statement by Richmond, P., "I do not think that the courts would be justified in imposing a
duty of care on builders tantamount to the full warranties normally implied in a building
contract. Any such extension to the present law seems to me to be more properly a matter for
legislation." Bowen v. Paramount Builders Ltd., [1977] 1 N.Z.L.R. 394, 413-14. For similar
American legislation, see Soug-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, CAL. CIv. CODE § 1790 et
seq.
207. For an economic analysis, see Symposium, Products Liability: Economic Analysis
and the Law, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1970). See also G. CALABRESI, supra note 26, at 13-14,
169; Anderson, Current Problems in Products Liability Law and ProductsLiability Insurance,
31 INS. COUNSEL J. 436 (1964).
208. Atiyah, supra note 3, at 276.
209. Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REV. 917,
951 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Economic Loss]. Contra, Note, Manufacturer'sStrict Tort
Liability to ConsumersforEconomic Loss, 41 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 401, 415-16 (1967) (liability
for economic loss would deter the marketing of defective products).
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occurs, this would be to the detriment of stability of economic relations - the possible high increase in the price of products - and of
the preservation of the freedom of action of the parties, especially
the manufacturer who may incur very large costs in claims for economic loss.
For these reasons, liability of manufacturers for economic loss
suffered by consumers of products will tend to be more narrowly
circumscribed than where physical or personal damage is suffered
or threatened. The widest scope of recovery under the principles of
Caltex, insofar as they can be articulated, is that a manufacturer
would be liable for pure economic loss suffered by a consumer
where the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that the particular consumer or perhaps class of consumers would use the product, and that a defect of that kind would foreseeably cause the
economic loss complained of. Thus, if a manufacturer of wool baling machines sold his products through distributors to farmers prior
to the shearing season, Caltex may give a right to recovery to farmers who suffer economic loss caused directly by defects in the machines.
United States courts reflect this reluctance to impose liability
in negligence for pure economic loss. The exclusory rule seems still
firmly implanted in products liability. 210 Recovery of economic
loss has been allowed, however, in strict liability 21 ' and breach of
212
warranty.
V.

CONCLUSION:

AN AUSTRALIAN TRANSPLANT?

In the United States, Australia, and other Commonwealth
countries, the exclusory rule has been subject to heavy strains to
reshape it in a more policy responsive form. The apparent virtue of
the exclusory rule was its positive ease of application. However,
application of the rule was complex and subject to doubt. The rule
led to anomalies; for example, it allowed recovery on the completely arbitrary chance that physical damage to the plaintiff's
property or person was manifested.
Caltex has freed Australian courts from this bondage. It
210. See Economic Loss, supra note 209, at 929-31; Bennett, Products Liability. Tortious
Recoveryfor EconomicLoss, 7 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 330, 336-37 (1974); Comment,
ProductsLiability.- Recovery ofEconomic Loss in California,13 CAL. W. L. REV. 297 (1977).
211. Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 309 (1965).
212. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 417, 161 A.2d 69, 102 (1960).
See generaly Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145 (1965) for recovery of
economic loss based on breach of warranty.
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would be premature, however, to claim that in Caltex the Australian High Court has finally resolved all of the questions. In the
process of formulating new law, some costs must be paid. Extra
2 13
resources will be required to determine the limits of liability.
These costs are generated by increased litigation and uncertainties
in the decisionmaking process. The courts were aware of the anomalies of the exclusory rule; they chose it with all its attendant
problems on the grounds of public policy. 21 4 Consequently, the
benefits of a new formulation of the law should have been weighed
against the costs of invoking the new rule 2 15 and the costs of retaining the old. The uncertainty that Caltex engenders in its failure to
create a framework for considering policy factors is significant in
the weighing process. The failure of the Caltex court to provide
this framework renders more difficult the task of the courts to consistently apply policy factors.
There is little doubt, however, that the Caltex decision will allow Australian courts to be more responsive and flexible. The
courts will be able to build a consistent body of case law that will
be free from the need to mold demands for recovery around the
interstices of an inadequate rule.
Although the High Court's decision can be criticized, it has
abolished the exclusory rule and put the law on a new path which
will allow recovery when policy demands it. In short, the case has
laid the foundations for a rationalization of the law. It is hoped
that United States courts will see in Caltex persuasive authority to
set their law on a similar track. It has been said of the exclusory
rule in the United States: "Only when this rule against recovery
has been eliminated will economic expectancies receive the protection which writers have urged, which courts are beginning to grant
'' 21 6
and which their social importance justifies.

213. See Feldthusen, supra note 3, at 21.
214. S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Sons Ltd., [1971] 1 Q.B. 337, 339.
But see Atiyah, supra note 3,1at 274-75 (suggesting ways of retaining the rule while avoiding
its capacious nature).
215. Feldthusen, supra note 3, at 15, 21.
216. Note, supra note 86, at 694.
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